BGPsec

Certification Authorities (CAs) within the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) manage BGPsec router certificates as well as RPKI certificates. The rollover of BGPsec router certificates must be carefully performed in order to synchronize the distribution of router public keys with BGPsec UPDATE messages verified with those router public keys. This document describes a safe rollover process, and it discusses when and why the rollover of BGPsec router certificates is necessary. When this rollover process is followed, the rollover will be performed without routing information being lost.

BGPsec-speaking routers are provisioned with private keys in order to sign BGPsec announcements. The corresponding public keys are published in the Global Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), enabling verification of BGPsec messages. This document describes two methods of generating the public-private key pairs: router-driven and operator-driven.

This document specifies the algorithms, algorithm parameters, asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key sizes, and signature formats used in BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security). This document updates RFC 7935 ("The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure") and obsoletes RFC 8208 ("BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats") by adding Documentation and Experimentation Algorithm IDs, correcting the range of unassigned algorithms IDs to fill the complete range, and restructuring the document for better reading.

This document also includes example BGPsec UPDATE messages as well as the private keys used to generate the messages and the certificates necessary to validate those signatures.

The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origin assertions. ISPs can also use the RPKI to validate the path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to establish a local view of exceptions to the RPKI data in the form of local filters and additions. The mechanisms described in this document provide a simple way to enable INR holders to establish a local, customized view of the RPKI, overriding global RPKI repository data as needed.

This document captures the design rationale of the initial draft version of what became RFC 8205 (the BGPsec protocol specification). The designers needed to balance many competing factors, and this document lists the decisions that were made in favor of or against each design choice. This document also presents brief summaries of the arguments that aided the decision process. Where appropriate, this document also provides brief notes on design decisions that changed as the specification was reviewed and updated by the IETF SIDR Working Group and that resulted in RFC 8205. These notes highlight the differences and provide pointers to details and rationale regarding those design changes.

This document describes BGPsec, an extension to the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) that provides security for the path of Autonomous Systems (ASes) through which a BGP UPDATE message passes. BGPsec is implemented via an optional non-transitive BGP path attribute that carries digital signatures produced by each AS that propagates the UPDATE message. The digital signatures provide confidence that every AS on the path of ASes listed in the UPDATE message has explicitly authorized the advertisement of the route.

This document discusses considerations and methods for supporting and securing a common method for Autonomous System (AS) migration within the BGPsec protocol.

Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and present the most critical and universal. Operational practices are expected to evolve as BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed.

This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol known as BGPsec. BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together. BGPsec is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the requirement to provide security for BGP. The goal of BGPsec is to provide full AS path validation based on the use of strong cryptographic primitives. The end entity (EE) certificates specified by this profile are issued to routers within an AS. Each of these certificates is issued under a Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificate. These CA certificates and EE certificates both contain the AS Resource extension. An EE certificate of this type asserts that the router or routers holding the corresponding private key are authorized to emit secure route advertisements on behalf of the AS(es) specified in the certificate. This document also profiles the format of certification requests and specifies Relying Party (RP) certificate path validation procedures for these EE certificates. This document extends the RPKI; therefore, this document updates the RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC 6487).

A systemic vulnerability of the Border Gateway Protocol routing system, known as "route leaks", has received significant attention in recent years. Frequent incidents that result in significant disruptions to Internet routing are labeled route leaks, but to date a common definition of the term has been lacking. This document provides a working definition of route leaks while keeping in mind the real occurrences that have received significant attention. Further, this document attempts to enumerate (though not exhaustively) different types of route leaks based on observed events on the Internet. The aim is to provide a taxonomy that covers several forms of route leaks that have been observed and are of concern to the Internet user community as well as the network operator community.

This document describes a threat model for the context in which External Border Gateway Protocol (EBGP) path security mechanisms will be developed. The threat model includes an analysis of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) and focuses on the ability of an Autonomous System (AS) to verify the authenticity of the AS path info received in a BGP update. We use the term "PATHSEC" to refer to any BGP path security technology that makes use of the RPKI. PATHSEC will secure BGP, consistent with the inter-AS security focus of the RPKI.

The document characterizes classes of potential adversaries that are considered to be threats and examines classes of attacks that might be launched against PATHSEC. It does not revisit attacks against unprotected BGP, as that topic has already been addressed in the BGP-4 standard. It concludes with a brief discussion of residual vulnerabilities.